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 Introduction 
 At ten past two in the afternoon of Friday 7th May 1915, Kapitänleutnant Walter 
Schwieger, commanding oﬃ  cer of the German submarine  U20 , ﬁ red a single tor-
pedo at the passenger liner  Lusitania . Eighteen minutes later the pride of the 
Cunard ﬂ eet disappeared beneath the waves, taking 1,198 men, women and chil-
dren with her. Th e sinking of the  Lusitania is undoubtedly the single most famous 
act of submarine warfare of the twentieth century. Not only did it galvanize 
 American opinion behind the Allied cause, but it also dramatically ushered in a 
new, more savage era in naval warfare. Th e  Lusitania was a civilian vessel struck 
without warning by an unseen opponent; the victims of the attack were all non-
combatants, innocent civilians going about their lawful business on the high seas. 
Th us, both in its method and in its results, this action brought the stark brutality 
of ‘total war’ to the world’s oceans. 1 
 For the history of the Royal Navy, the sinking of the  Lusitania has a further 
signiﬁ cance. Th e demise of this great ship, sailing as it was unarmed and 
unescorted oﬀ  the Irish coast, serves for many as demonstrable proof of the 
backwardness of British naval thinking. 2 Th at so famous and important a vessel 
could be allowed to travel alone and unprotected and, thereby, be left to its own 
fate in dangerous waters showed that no thought had been given by those in 
charge of Britain’s maritime defences to the realities of the peril the country 
faced. Had the Royal Navy been truly prepared for modern ‘total’ warfare, so 
the argument runs, it would have anticipated that Germany would seek to 
defeat Britain with an attack on its ocean trade, and measures to protect British 
commerce from such methods would have been thought through ahead of time 
and put into place from the war’s outset. 
 Th is is a compelling argument, and it is certainly true that Britain was not ready 
for unrestricted submarine warfare, a tactic that almost brought about the nation’s 
defeat in 1917. Yet, ironically, the  Lusitania itself is proof that, well before the 
outbreak of the First World War, the Royal Navy had in fact given a great deal of 
thought to the possibility of a German assault on British trade. For the very liner 
that succumbed so dramatically to a German torpedo in 1915 had been speciﬁ cally 
  1  Arnold Kludas,  Great Passenger Ships of the World. Volume 1: 1858–1912 (Cambridge, 1975), 
p. 134 . In fact, as James Goldrick has shown, the ﬁ rst German exercise in total war at sea was the less 
high-proﬁ le decision to ﬁ re on British trawlers. However, this has not captured the popular imagina-
tion in the same way as the sinking of the  Lusitania .  James Goldrick,  Th e King’s Ships were at Sea: Th e 
War in the North Sea, August 1914–February 1915 (Annapolis, MD, 1984), p. 79 . 
  2  Patrick Beesly,  Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914–1918 (London, 1982), p. 86 ;  David Staf-
ford,  Churchill and Secret Service (London, 1997), p. 74 . 
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conceived a decade earlier to protect British commerce from a German attack. Th e 
product of an agreement between the Cunard Company and the British govern-
ment, the  Lusitania and her sister,  Mauretania , were meant to serve as luxury pas-
senger vessels in peacetime but to transform into auxiliary cruisers in wartime. To 
this end, they were built with massive turbines capable of generating a high sea-
speed, large coal bunkers designed to provide great endurance, and pre-established 
ﬁ ttings for gun mountings intended to facilitate an easy-to-install oﬀ ensive 
 capability. 3 Considerable sums of public money went into making this possible. 
 Th e Admiralty’s decision to oﬀ er Cunard a huge subsidy to build two fast liners 
capable of conversion into fast auxiliary cruisers reﬂ ected the navy’s emerging belief 
that a new and dangerous threat to British commerce was being created. Th e threat 
in question came not from Britain’s traditional enemies, France and Russia, but 
from a new opponent, Germany, whose extensive ﬂ eet of large Atlantic liners—
though not U-boats, of which she then had none—was viewed with apprehension. 
Admiralty intelligence suggested, not entirely without reason as we shall see, that 
these ships were capable of exceptional speed, were manned largely by naval reserv-
ists and always had arms stowed on board. As a result, at the very moment war 
broke out, it was feared that these vessels would be converted into auxiliary war-
ships and sent to prey on the trade routes in the manner of the privateers of old. In 
this capacity they would be very dangerous. Because of their exceptional speed not 
only would no British merchantmen be able to escape them, but, more worrying 
still, no British warships would be able to catch them. Th ey would, therefore, be in 
a position to run amok on the sea lanes; hence the idea of building two even faster 
 British liners to track them down. 
 Paying Cunard to build the  Lusitania and  Mauretania was the ﬁ rst step in a 
twelve-year history of Admiralty eﬀ orts to counter the threat to British commerce 
that was expected to come from Germany’s large ﬂ eet of fast transatlantic liners, 
the so-called ‘ocean greyhounds’. Th ese eﬀ orts included developing new types of 
auxiliary and then regular warships; a campaign to change international law to 
prohibit the conversion of civilian ships into men-of-war on the high seas; and the 
establishment of a new global intelligence network to determine the location of 
German liners and route British merchantmen away from them. Finally, following 
the appointment of Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty in late 1911, 
the controversial decision was taken to undertake a major programme of arming 
British merchant vessels for their own defence, a decision that also involved taking 
steps to place trained gun crews on these vessels in peacetime. Two years were 
devoted to developing and implementing this scheme. 
 Th ese various eﬀ orts to defend British commerce from German attack absorbed 
considerable resources at the Admiralty. Yet, despite the time, energy and money 
devoted to them, the idea that the British naval leadership perceived a danger to the 
nation’s seaborne trade from a German assault, let alone that it spent twelve years 
  3  Th e high coal consumption of these vessels when travelling at speed, a trait which would 
severely limit their range, notwithstanding the capacity of their bunkers, was not considered at 
the time. 
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developing countermeasures to meet this threat, has received almost no recognition 
from historians. Th e standard work on the Admiralty’s trade defence planning 
before the First World War is a 1968 doctoral dissertation by Brian Ranft. 4 While 
this is an important piece of research, its value as a study of pre-war policy is limited 
by virtue of its chronological range. Ranft’s main interest was the nineteenth cen-
tury and, as a result, he took his account no further than 1905, thereby omitting, 
quite logically, all consideration of the crucial decade before the outbreak of war. 
Accordingly, he has almost nothing to say either about German plans to attack Brit-
ish commerce or about any prospective British schemes to counter them. Nor, it 
seems, has anybody else. Although it is over four decades since Ranft completed his 
examination, no other historian has attempted to continue the work he began and 
explain British trade protection policy in the run up to the First World War. How 
can one account for this remarkable gap in the literature? 
 One explanation is that the attention of historians has been directed elsewhere. 
Contrary to some peacetime visions of what naval warfare would actually look like, 
when the ﬁ ghting did ﬁ nally begin in August 1914, the war at sea turned out to be 
dominated not by confrontations between ﬂ eets, as had been widely and errone-
ously anticipated, but by two long-running, slowly fought, global battles: the 
Allied ‘blockade’ of the Central Powers and Germany’s unrestricted submarine 
campaign against Allied shipping. Th e impact that these two protracted struggles 
exerted, ﬁ rst upon the course of the conﬂ ict and, subsequently, upon the popular 
imagination, has led to much research being targeted into these areas in preference 
to other related ﬁ elds. Th us, for example, many of the historians who have looked 
at British preparations for economic warfare before the First World War have been 
much more interested in the  oﬀ ensive aspects of British policy, namely the plans to 
exclude Germany from global commerce, than on the  defensive plans to protect 
British trade from German deprivations. Th ese are usually dealt with only brieﬂ y 
and in the most general terms. In a similar way, a great deal of thought has been 
devoted to the question of why the British government failed to anticipate the 
U-boat threat, a focus that, by deﬁ nition, reﬂ ects the dictates of hindsight and the 
obsessions of the present rather than the issues that concerned contemporary 
policy- makers. Hence, in much of the current literature, explaining what was not 
foreseen—that is, U-boats—is given priority over the more accurate predictions 
that were made, such as the fact that Germany intended to attack British shipping 
with surface raiders. 
 A further and more substantive barrier to the proper consideration of this topic 
is the current and highly polarized debate about the origins and nature of the 
Anglo-German naval race. Two alternative and radically diﬀ erent schools of 
thought exist over when, why, or even if, the German Empire came to be perceived 
by the British government as a likely future opponent. In the traditional canon of 
naval history, as ﬁ rst formulated in 1940 by Arthur Marder, the British Admiralty 
realized as early as 1902 that the German naval construction programme, begun in 
  4  Brian Ranft, ‘Th e Naval Defence of British Sea-Borne Trade, 1860–1905’ (Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Oxford, 1968) . 
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1898 under the auspices of Admiral Tirpitz, was being undertaken with the explicit 
purpose of building a ﬂ eet capable of ﬁ ghting a major engagement against the 
Royal Navy in the North Sea. Accordingly, the British naval authorities promptly 
strove to meet this challenge. From this point onwards, the actions of the Admi-
ralty, including the building of ever more warships, the introduction of new tech-
nologies and the gradual withdrawal of Britain’s scattered naval forces to home 
waters, were principally driven by the need to counter the threat posed by the 
expansion of German maritime power. 5 
 In reaching this conclusion, Marder, like Tirpitz, focused principally on battle-
ships. He reasoned that the German decision to construct warships for a ﬂ eet 
engagement rather than cruisers for service in distant waters implied a strategy of 
ﬁ ghting a traditional naval battle in the North Sea rather than a  guerre de course 
against British shipping throughout the world’s oceans and that the British naval 
authorities recognized this intention. As a result, though they were concerned 
about the British battle ﬂ eet being defeated by its German counterpart and of 
Britain thereby losing command of the sea, they saw no threat to British commerce 
so long as Germany was their main enemy. Accordingly, trade defence was not a 
matter that concerned them. 
 Th e orthodox narrative about British fears of a German threat going back to 
1902 was a compelling one; however, not everyone was convinced. Th e ﬁ rst major 
critic was Ruddock Mackay. He argued that the nature of the British ﬂ eet rede-
ployment of 1904, carried out by the new First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, 
showed that well after 1902 the traditional Franco-Russian naval challenge rather 
than the German threat was still the main focus of the Admiralty’s attention. Con-
sequently, whatever might have occurred afterwards, before 1905 Britain’s naval 
authorities were not unduly concerned by Germany’s growing battle ﬂ eet. 6 
Mackay’s careful critique was subsequently taken up with gusto by two other revi-
sionist historians, Jon Sumida and Nicholas Lambert. Th ey agreed with Mackay’s 
contention that Fisher’s redistribution demonstrated that he ‘regarded France and 
Russia as the Royal Navy’s most likely opponents in any future war . . . [and was 
not] unduly concerned at the expansion of the German Navy.’ 7 Additionally, they 
appended a further element to the argument, proposing that Fisher’s Franco-Rus-
sian focus and his concomitant lack of interest in Germany were heavily inﬂ uenced 
by the ability of the former and the inability of the latter to threaten British trade. 
As Nicholas Lambert explains it, ‘having thought deeply about the character of 
twentieth-century maritime war’, Fisher saw no danger of Britain losing command 
  5  Arthur J. Marder,  Th e Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880–1905 (New York, 1940) ;  Arthur J. Marder,  Fear God and Dread Nought: Th e 
Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone. Volume 2: Years of Power, 1904–1914 
(London, 1956 ; hereafter referred to as  FGDN );  Arthur J. Marder,  From the Dreadnought to Scapa 
Flow. Volume I: Th e Road to War, 1904–1914 (Oxford, 1961) . 
  6  Ruddock F. Mackay, ‘Th e Admiralty, the German Navy, and the redistribution of the British 
Fleet, 1904–1905’,  Mariner’s Mirror 56 (1970), 341–6 ;  Ruddock F. Mackay,  Fisher of Kilverstone 
(Oxford, 1973), pp. 314–19 . 
  7  Nicholas A. Lambert, ‘Strategic command and control for maneuver warfare: Creation of the 
Royal Navy’s “War Room” system, 1905–1915’,  Journal of Military History 69 (2005), 375–6 . 
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of her home waters to a foreign battle ﬂ eet, the threat of which could cheaply and 
easily be neutralized by small torpedo craft. Instead, he believed that the principal 
peril to the nation lay in ‘a stranglehold’ being placed on the British economy by a 
foreign power being able to ‘harass her trade routes’, depriving the nation of vital 
supplies of food and raw materials. Th e weapon of choice for this purpose, says 
Lambert, was the armoured cruiser. Th e French and Russian navies had long 
espoused a  guerre de course strategy, had access to numerous overseas bases and were 
equipped with large numbers of armoured cruisers explicitly designed for com-
merce destroying. As a result, they were seen as posing a signiﬁ cant danger. By 
contrast, the Germans, with a growing force of battleships, designed to ﬁ ght a 
traditional ﬂ eet action in the North Sea, but negligible numbers of armoured cruis-
ers for attacking the trade routes, appeared hardly a menace at all. Indeed, so little 
threat did they pose that, according to Lambert, they were only considered by the 
Admiralty in the unlikely context ‘that Germany might join a Franco-Russian 
combination against Britain’. 8 In short, according to Sumida and Lambert, because 
Germany did not possess the  warships for commerce raiding (auxiliary cruisers 
were not considered in this argument), the growth of German sea power neither 
worried the Admiralty nor required any particular focus on trade defence. 
 While there is little shared ground between the two competing interpretations of 
the Anglo-German naval race, they do have one element in common: both assert that 
the growth of German sea power, being based upon the battleship rather than the 
cruiser, did not threaten the ﬂ ow of goods in and out of the British Isles and, therefore, 
did not provide any stimulus for the Admiralty to develop new measures to protect 
the nation’s commerce. With this point embedded in both sides of the argument, it is 
little wonder that it is generally accepted in the current literature that there is no need 
for the historian to look deeply into the question of British measures to protect mari-
time trade from German attack, since the Admiralty ignored the matter in the run up 
to the First World War in the mistaken belief that Germany, with a short coastline, 
few overseas bases and only a small number of cruisers, was ill-equipped to wage such 
a war and would be unable to do so in practice. 9 If the historian wishes to study any-
thing, says Angus Ross, in an important and well-known article on the alleged British 
failure to anticipate an attack on the nation’s trade that exempliﬁ es this thinking, it 
should not be the few pitiful measures that were taken in this area, but the reason for 
the ‘complacency’ that led to this ‘collective lack of action’. 10 
 Th is book challenges both the orthodox and revisionist interpretations. It argues 
that the expansion of German maritime power became an important consideration 
in the thinking of the British naval authorities from the very start of the twentieth 
  8  Nicholas A. Lambert, ‘Transformation and technology in the Fisher era: Th e impact of the com-
munications revolution’,  Th e Journal of Strategic Studies 27 (2004), 273 . 
  9  See, for example,  Paul M. Kennedy, ‘Great Britain before 1914’, in Ernest R. May (ed.),  Knowing 
One’s Enemies: Intelligence before the Two World Wars (Princeton, 1984), p. 187 . 
  10  Angus Ross, ‘Losing the initiative in mercantile warfare: Great Britain’s surprising failure to antic-
ipate maritime challenges to her global trading network in the First World War’,  International Journal 
of Naval History 1 (2002) <http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume1_number1_Apr02/article_ross_great-
britain_mercantile.doc.htm> 
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century, much earlier than the current revisionist consensus would allow. However, 
contrary to the orthodox view that this concern derived exclusively from the 
growth of the German battle ﬂ eet, it demonstrates instead that fear of German 
commerce raiding was, in fact, one of the initial spurs. In 1901, elements within 
the Admiralty identiﬁ ed what they regarded as a real and potent danger to British 
trade from Germany’s extensive ﬂ eet of large Atlantic liners. Th ey feared, rightly as 
it transpired, that the Germans planned to convert these great vessels in wartime 
into auxiliary cruisers and send them as corsairs onto the trade routes. With their 
high speeds, excellent sea-keeping qualities and supposedly exceptional cruising 
radiuses, it was anticipated that they would be formidable adversaries, capable of 
making numerous early captures that would cause panic in the international ship-
ping world and possibly force Britain to make peace. Th us, irrespective of whether 
or not they were concerned either then or subsequently by the growth of the 
 German battle ﬂ eet, this gave the naval authorities in London reason to focus on 
the expansion of German maritime power and to plan against it. Additionally, hav-
ing once identiﬁ ed the threat from German surface raiders, the Admiralty remained 
highly concerned right up to the outbreak of war at the prospect of a German 
 guerre de course against British seaborne commerce. Accordingly, it spent the next 
twelve years devising ways to counter it. It is this story of the menace posed by 
Germany’s ‘ocean greyhounds’ and the extensive and long-term nature of the Brit-
ish response to it that will be told here. 
 In the process, several important conclusions will be reached. First, from the end 
of 1901, the British Admiralty identiﬁ ed a threat to the nation’s shipping from fast 
armed German merchant vessels, principally transatlantic liners. Second, the 
Admiralty was not wrong to do so. Germany  did develop and continuously reﬁ ne 
schemes for deploying its liners in a commerce war and these plans grew in scope 
and sophistication over time. Th ird, over the next twelve years the Royal Navy 
unrolled a series of initiatives designed to frustrate the German design. Finally, 
because these countermeasures were all introduced, either wholly or partly, to 
combat the menace of German mercantile cruisers, the measures discussed are not 
separate, isolated and individual initiatives in the broad sweep of British naval 
policy, but must be seen as related actions linked together by a single thread and 
forming part of a common narrative, namely British preparation for a commerce 
war undertaken against the nation’s shipping by German surface raiders. As a 
result, it will be concluded that the generally held theory that Britain did not 
expect a campaign to be launched against her seaborne trade in wartime, the so-
called ‘surprising failure to anticipate maritime challenges to her global trading 
network’, proves to be not so much surprising as a myth. 11 As this book shows, 
such a challenge was both clearly anticipated and systematically addressed in the 
country’s naval preparations. 
 11   Ibid. 
